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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

ion of
the parties is to be sought and carried out whenever pos7

sible.

If the language of the instrument is unambiguous, the intention
must be ascertained from the language itself,8 but if the language
of the instrument is vague and general or is ambiguous, evidence
is admissible to show the actual intention of the parties. 9 In the
absence of any such explanation, the instrument is to be construed
most favorably to the grantee.10
Ordinarily a gift in general terms to A followed by a gift to
another "at" or "upon!' A's death creates merely a life estate in
A."
It is submitted that under the general rules of construction
of a deed, the deed in the instant case created merely a life estate
in the grantee with a remainder in fee to the grantor and that in
any event the decision of the court reads into the instrument a
condition which is not actually there and which could only be read
in upon competent evidence as to the intention of the parties on
the ground that the language of the deed itself was ambiguous and
uncertain.
BERNARD C. GAVIT.
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE.-[Federal]

The doubtful wis-

dom, from the economic viewpoint, of holding that a seller's efforts
to control the resale price of his product are always harmful and
should not be permitted to succeed, is interestingly illustrated in
a recent case which raises the question in a somewhat unusual
manner.' The American Tobacco Company (hereafter called the
defendant), as well as other manufacturers of tobacco products,
sold its goods to jobbers at 90% of a certain schedule of prices
called "list" prices. It suggested that its customers should sell to
retailers only on the basis of these, list prices. This suggestion was
frequently disregarded by jobbers, to the mutual dissatisfaction of
competing jobbers who saw their margin of profit reduced or even
wiped out, and of the defendant which found its system of distribution disorganized. As a result in various cities where the extremest
price-cutting conditions prevailed the jobbers themselves took steps
to protect themselves by forming loose organizations, which all jobbers were urged to join, which then fixed the proper prices at which
sales to retailers should be made. Members were urged to observe
these prices, and all violators, whether members or not, were subjected to such pressure as the organization could bring to bear, to
7. Mittell v. Karl 133 Ill. 65, 24 N. E. 553, 8 L. R. A. 655; Wilson v.

Carrico 140 Ind. 533, 40 N. E. 50, 49 A. S. R. 213.
8. Fowler v. Black 136 Ill. 363, 26 N. E. 596, 11 L. L A. 670.
-9. Dixon v. Van Hoose 157 Ala. 459, 47 So. 718, 19 L. R. A. N. S. 719.
10. Davenport v. Gwilliats 133 Ind. 142.
11. Tiffany op. cit. (2nd ed.) Vol. 1, p. 79.
1. American Tobacco Company v. Federal Trade Commission (1925)

Fed. (2d) 570.

9
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get them in line. The most effective measure was to shut off their
purchases from the manufacturers. The manufacturers, including
the defendant, were not only in sympathy with the aims of such
organizations, but actively urged upon jobbers the desirability of
establishing them. When, therefore, one of these organizations
transmitted to the defendant the names of several offending jobbers
(members and non-members) and requested its assistance by a
refusal to send any further supplies to them, the defendant readily
agreed and did refuse to make any further sales to the offenders until
they should be reinstated. The respondent commission thereupon
issued an order requiring it to cease from assisting any of its dealer
customers in maintaining the resale prices agreed upon by such
dealer customers. The present proceeding was on a petition to review
thi order. It should be noticed (1) that there was no attempt by
anyone to set the prices at which retailers should sell to ultimate
consumeils, (2) that while the defendant did suggest the prices to be
exacted of retailers, it did not insist on the organizations' adopting
these suggestions; the latter were free to agree on other prices and in
the present case had in fact decided on a scale substantially lower than
the defendant's suggestions. Provided that the jobbers were satisfied,
the defendant was quite content also.2

The commission's order to

cease and desist was set aside by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The English courts have never felt the hostility to any form of
resale price maintenance so strikingly shown by our federal courts.3
Typical of their reaction is Mr. Justice Phillimore's statement 4 that
"Price maintenance agreements are modern things and are strange
to those who have been brought up on older lines, but they are in
almost universal commercial use, and it would be a scandal if they
could not be enforced." Such a view, however, has never been
adopted by the Canadian courts, which have held without exception
that this type of agreement was opposed to public interests., In the
United States the state courts have been unable to reach any agreement, such provisions in a sale contract being sometimes considered
with little or no disfavor, 6 sometimes regarded as clearly against
public policy because in reduction of the competition between job2. Although the various manufacturers who thus co-operated with the
jobbers' organizations controlled so large a share of the tobacco products
that jobbers could not carry on business without dealing with them, the proceedings raised no question of monopoly under the Sherman Act. The sole
question was as to the fairness or unfairness of the defendant's method in
itself.
3. The leading case is Elliman v. Carrington (1901) 2 Ch. 275.
4. In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co. (1913) 29 T. L. R.
270.
5. Wainpole v. Lyons (1904) 25 Rap. Jud. de Quebec (Super.) 390;
Wampole & Co. v. Karn Co. (1906) 11 Ont. L. 619.
6. Grogan v. Chaffee (1909) 156 Calif. 611; Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker (1912) 164 Calif. 355; Garst v. Charles (1904) 187 Mass. 144; Ingersoll v. Hahne (1917) 88 N. J. Eq. 222; ditto (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 332. The
two last naied were decided after the U. S. Supreme Court had taken its
definite stand on the opposite side.
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bers or between retailer,7 and sometimes as depending for their fate
on further considerations, such as whether the article involved was
the monopoly in any event (e. g., where made under a patent) of
the seller, who in such a case could not be charged with attempting
to restrain trade." Almost without exception they show little attempt
to make any real analysis of the economic significance of a contract
whose economic desirability or undesirability is the entire question
before them. The opposite aspect of the problem, viz., the desirability
of freedom of contact, gains even slighter notice. In only two
cases was a more thorough analysis made, and in both the restriction was upheld.9
The federal courts, under the leadership of Miles v. Park0
have taken a decided stand against resale price maintenance, and
although a producer has the bare right to refuse to sell to anyone
he chooses," he may not by agreement or concerted action with
others make this refusal follow as a consequence of violations of
price agreements reported to him.' 2 In view of this background a
decision adverse to the defendant might have been looked for. It
comes as a surprise to find that the decision favors the defendant's
price fixing efforts. To arrive at this result the court was forced to
distinguish Miles v. Park and Federal Trade Commission v. BeechNut Packing Co. For the former this was done by showing that in
it the producer was attempting to control the price at which retailers were selling to consumers by preventing wholesalers from making sales to recalcitrant retailers. Here however the defendant was
concerning itself only with wholesalers' prices to retailers. The
latter were free to charge what they liked. While this does distinguish the cases, their deeper opposition is not touched. The essence
of the Miles case lies in Mr. Justice Hughes' statement that "The
complainant having sold his product at prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever advantage may be derived
from competition in the subsequent traffic," even in the next sale it
would seem. Another point of difference between the two cases
lies in who did the price fixing. In the Miles case it was the producer himself who did so, and it was said that he could fare no better than would be the case if the restriction emanated from the
dealers, thus plainly indicating at least as much hostility to the lat•7. Hill v. Gray (1910) 163 Mich. 12; Freeman v. Miller (1909) 9 Ohio
N. P. N. S.26.
8. Garst v. Harris (1900) 177 Mass. 72.
9. Fisher Flourin.q Mills Co. v. Swanson (1913) 76 Wash. 649;. Park v.
National Druggists' Ass. (1903) 175 N. Y. 1. The latter is in many
respects especially like the principal case, except that the price was fixed by
the manufacturers, not by the association of druggists.
10. (1911) 220 U. S. 373.
11. U. S. v. Colgate & Co. (1919) 250 U. S. 300.
12. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. (1922) 257 U.
S. 441. The United States Supreme Court cases down to and including this
case are analyzed by Ch. W. Dunn in "Resale Price Maintenance" (1923)

Yale Law Jour. 32:676.
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ter situation. Yet here it was precisely the dealers who set the
price, and for some reason this seems to have been regarded as a
point in the defendant's favor. The Beech-Nut case too is distinguished on the ground that there was no attempt to fix retail prices.
But the principal contribution made by that case was that price fixing passed the forbidden line when it was enforced or aided by
co-operative means. Contracts were not a requisite; any form of
joint effort was enough. It may be that this is an impossible line to
draw, and that there is an insensible gradation from the clearest
co-operation, on through mere "suggestions" by the producer, coupled with spontaneous aid by sympathetic distributors, all the way
to unexplained conduct by the producer, on which he allows distributors to put their own interpretation. 13 But whether the line can be
drawn or not, it has been laid down and the co-operation between
the defendant and the jobbers' organization in the instant case was
of the clearest kind.
It is difficult therefore to escape the conclusion that the court is
in reality trying to reopen the entire subject of the economic undesirability of resale price fixing. This impression is strengthened by
their reference in several parts of the .opinion to such economic
arguments as the demoralization of the defendant's means of distribution and by their assertion that "practices cannot be regarded
as unfair methods of competition" which seek to prevent such
demoralization.
Such a fundamental about-face may be highly desirable.
Where there is one believer in the wisdom of enforcing entire freedom as to resale prices, 14 there are a half dozen who ag earnestly
urge the fairness and desirability of allowing producers to set the
price at which their goods shall everywhere be sold. The center of
their argument is that whatever the legal form may be the distribution of a specialty remains of vital concern to the producer even
though he has parted with legal title to the article itself, that the
jobbers and retailers are in fact as much a part of his selling organ13. The difficulty of determining where co-operation ceases and independent action begins, and of making a rule of public policy hinge on the
answer is well put in a speech by Federal Trade Commissioner Gaskill,
reprinted in the Congressional Record. 68th Congress. Feb. 13, 1924. p. 2383.
14. This view is admirably argued by W. H. S. Stevens in "Resale
Price Maintenance as Unfair Competition" (1919) Columbia Law Rev.
19:265. See also Fed. Trade Comnission v. Mishawaka Woolen Mfg. Co.
(1919) 1 F. T. C. Dec. 506. The gist of these arguments is that fixing a
resale price penalizes the efficient low-cost distributor in favor of the highcost one. The weakness of this position is in its assumption that the pricecutting will be done by a more efficient distributor who by reason of his
greater efficiency will still distribute at a profit. It is much more likely that
the price-cutter will be no more efficient than his rivals, but that his cutting
will be due simply to a desire to attract customers to whom he can then sell
other goods at such a profit as to make up for the lack of profit (or even
loss) on the article used as bait. Under such an interpretation the person
desiring to cut prices would not necessarily be the more efficient distributor,
but rather the distributor (whether efficient or not) who was large enough
to deal in several different lines of goods.
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ization as his salesmen are ;15 that if he is unable to control them in
this manner he must either allow his good will and the reputation
of his specialty to be appropriated by the price-cutter to benefit the
latter's business, or at great cost to himself he must do his own distributing, a course impossible for the small producer and so tending
directly toward more and more centralization of production;1 in
short, that it is unsound to declare always against public policy a
practice that has many highly useful aspects which greater discrimination might enable us to preserve.17 It is apparent, then, that there
are weighty, if not preponderating arguments for a radical revision
of the doctrines of the Miles and the Beech-Nut cases. It is still
highly doubtful whether such a revision could or should come from
the courts. The courts could carry out such a task only by close
distinctions between almost identical situations, minute refinements
resting on no real differences, a method of growth well enough
suited to certain fields of law, but wholly unsuited to the development of a new formulation of public policy. Such a formulation
must be clear and definite, not only that its meaning may be understood by everyone (certainly not an end achieved by the present line
of Supreme Court cases), but also that its underlying idea may
not risk becoming gradually lost. It would seem to follow that the
change can be made most su6cessfully only by means of legislation' 8 and that the instant case, however sound its economic direction probably is, may in reality be merely postponing the thorough
and entire reconsideration that the'subject demands.
E. W. PUTTKAMITIER.
SPECIAL AsSESSMENTS-VIEW OF PREmISES.- [Illinois]
City of Carbondale v. Reith the court uses this language:

In

"It was held in Vane v. City of Evanston, 150 Ill. 616, that it was
within the power of the court, in its sound discretion, to permit the
jury in a special assessment proceeding, to view the premises to enable them better to apply the evidence, but the facts ascertained by the
jury upon such view could not in themselves be considered as evidence in arriving at the verdict.

.

.

. The parties had no means of

15. Siumner H. Slichter "The Cream of Wheat Case" (1916) Pol. Sci.
Quar. 31:392.
16. This argument is used by the American Fair Trade League. See
its Daily News Record for June 4, 1925.
17. Telling arguments for this side of the controversy can be found in
Kales "Contracts and Combinations in Restraint of Trade" (1918) secs. 35
to 39. See also Henderson "The Federal Trade Commission" (1924) p. 287
ff., and Rogers "Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade" (1913) Harv.
Law Rev. 27:139 at 151 ff.
18. Many efforts have of course been made to. get such legislation
through Congress. One of the most promising of these was the CapperKelly Resale Price Bill, on which public hearings were held in Washington
on April 22 and 23, 1926. An abstract of the testimony of those favoring
the measure has been prepared by the American Fair Trade League.
1. (1925)

538, 546.
316 Ill.

